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RECENT CASES
mcans by which the equivalent of personal service might be made upon -a
nonresident although he was not actually within the state". Courts considering
the application of tolling statutes in conjunction with nonresident motorist serv-
ice statutes must, of course, decide whether an exception should be made to
the tolling statute so that substituted service becomes the only avenue of
relief available to the plaintiff, or whether the defendant's absence should
suspend the period of limitation so that plaintiff may at his own option pro-
ceed by substituted service or wait until personal service is possible8.
The majority of courts hold that since the substituted service statutes
provide the plaintiff with a complete remedy within the state the statute of
limitations will continue to run9 . The minority view, set forth in the dis-
senting opinion in the instant case'", is that in the absence of an expressed
exception in the tolling statute dealing with' cases where the plaintiff could
have statutory service of process on the defendant, it is not within the province
of the court to create an exception". Courts upholding the majority opinion
reason "that it is the intent of that body (i. e. the legislature) that governs
and not the literal meaning of the words employed."12
It is submitted that the majority holding is the more justifiable. It is the
basic purpose of the tolling statute to prevent one from avoiding judgment
hy evading the service of process13 . However, service remains impossible if
the defendant continues to remain unavailable. The use of statutory substituted
service removes this possibility and provides a method for a plaintiff to bring
such cases to bar within the statutory period.
DAVID A. VAALER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SIXTH AMENDMENT - RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION -
Plaintiff, warden of a state penitentiary, instituted mandamus proceedings to
compel defendant judges to vacate orders requiring plaintiff to produce ;a
convicted felon as a witness for the accused in a criminal prosecution. Plaintiff
refused on the strength of an Oregon statute authorizing examination of
imprisoned felons by deposition.' The court dismissed the writ of mandamus.
That part of the statute invoked by plaintiff was unconstitutional since it
7. Coombs v. Darling, 116 Conn. 643, 166 At. 70 (1933).
8. See 33 Ill. L. Rev. 351 (1938).
9. Scorza v. Deatherage, 208 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1954); Tublitz v. Hirchfeld, 118
F.2d 29 (2nd Cir. 1941); Coombs v. Darling, 116 Conn. 643, 166 Ati. 70 (1933);
Kokenge v. Holthaus, 243 Iowa 571, 52 N.W.2d (1952); Arrowood v. McMinn County,
173 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566 (1938); Reed v. Rosenfield, 115 Vt. 76, 51 A.2d
189 (1947).
10. Judge Rudolph in his dissent said, "The majority opinion now writes into the
statute another exception. It is my view that such action usurps the legislative function.
'Where express exceptions are m.ade, the legal presumption is that the legislature did not
intend to save other cases from the operation of the statute. In such cases the inference
is a strong one that no other exceptions were intended, and the rule generally applied -s
that an exception in a statute amounts to an affirmation of the application of its provisions
to all other cases not excepted"'".
11. Gotheiner v. Lenihan, 20 N. J. Misc. 119, 25 A.2d 430 (1942); Couts v. Rose,
152 Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950); Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252 N.W.
284 (1934).
12; See Read v. Jerauld County, 70 S. D. 298, 17 N.W.2d 269 (1948); Brookings
County v. Murphy, 23 S. D. 311, 121 N.W. 793 (1909).
13. See Reed v. Rosenfield, 115 Vt. 76, 51 A.2d 189 (1947).
1. Ore. Rev. Stat. 44.230(3) (1953).
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conflicted with a subsequent statute,2 which was the legislative "definition
and construction" of the Oregon constitutional provision3 allowing the ac-
cused to confront "the witnesses face to face." This was construed to mean
witnesses for as well against the accused. Justice Lusk concurred on the ground
that the statute relied upon by plaintiff was an unconstitutional infringement
of the right of the accused in a criminal prosecution to compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor. State ex. rel. Gladden v. Lonergan,
269 P.2d 491 (Ore. 1954).
The common law "right of confrontation" was incorporated in the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution,
4 which states: ". . . in all
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .... ." This guarantees that the accused has the right
to hear and cross examine only the witnesses against him.
5 In contrast,
the Oregon Constitution guarantees the right to confront the "witnesses
face to face." There is a presumption against inadvertence when the framers
of a constitution, in basing its provisions on a former constitution, omit a word
or words.6 Though the result under the Sixth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution would differ from the instant case, the Sixth Amendment is,
of course, only a limitation on the acts of the federal government.
7
It has been held that the essence of confrontation is the assurance that
the accused shall have the right to cross examine.
8 Referring to confrontation
and cross examination, one case stated, "The right to the latter was . . .
secured only . ..by . . . the former and in reality it is an instance of the
same right exemplified by different terms." Thus it would seem that con-
frontation of a friendly witness would be purposeless since cross examination
would not be appropriate. However, confrontation involves advantages other
than cross examination. The conduct of the witness on the stand can be
observed in judging the value of the testimony.'
0 In this respect confrontation
could benefit the accused whether the witness is friendly, or hostile. In any
event, it appears clear that the Constitution of Oregon does guaranty the
right to confront even friendly witnesses. However, reasoning that the existence
of this right leads necessarily to the conclusion that the prisoner-witness must
be produced may involve a non sequitur." Normally, a right of confrontation
is asserted to prevent the admission of a deposition of a witness,"
- not to
compel a custodian to produce a witness in his custody. The fact that the
deposition is inadmissable could as well mean that the testimony of the wit-
ness is unavailable as that his custodian can be compelled to produce him in
in person.
The plaintiff's refusal to produce the prisoner might have been upheld
2. Ore. Rev. Stat. 136.530 (1953) 'In a criminal action, the testimony of a witness
shall be given orally in the presence of the court and jury, except in the case of a wit-
ness whose testimony is taken by deposition by order of the court.
3. Ore. Const. Art. I, §11.
4. United States v. Barrocota, 45 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
5. United States v. Barrocota, supra note 4.
6. Cawley v. Pershing County, 50 Nev. 237, 225 Pac. 1073 (1927).
7. Blass v. Weigel, 85 F. Supp. 775 (D. N.J. 1949); Ex parte Carter, 14 N. 3.
Super. 591, 82 A.2d 652 (1951).
8. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U. S. 325 (1911); Brown v. State, 81 Okla. Crim.
314, 164 P.2d 401 (.1945).
9. People v. Werblow, 123 Misc. 204, 205 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1924).
10. 2 Wigmore, Evidence §1365 (3d ed. 1940).
11. Cf. Instant case at 505 (concurring opinion).
12. Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237 (1895).
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if a deposition of the prisoner had been admissable. Generally the right of
confrontation prohibits the use of depositions of a witness if the witness is
within the jurisdiction of the court and it is possible to obtain his presence
by proper process. 13 There are certain exceptions to this rule. If a witness
dies after giving testimony at a prior trial where the accused had an oppor-
tunity to cross examine, his testimony may be read at subsequent trial for
the same offense. 1 4 If the accused has not had an opportunity to cross examine,
depositions of an absent or deceased witnes are inadmissable, 15 unless the
accused has caused the witness to be absent.16 Statutes permitting the ad-
mission of depositions in criminal actions where the witness is in imminent
danger of death or is residing without the state are constitutional if the
accused is afforded the opportunity to be present when the deposition is
taken so that he can confront and cross examine the witness.'
7
The use of depositions in the instant case would not come within any
of the recognized exceptions to the rule of confrontation. Of course, since
a friendly witness is involved here, the accused would not object to the
introduction of the testimony by the use of a deposition, if it were necessary
to do so.
The question in the instant case would arise only in states having consti-
tutions following the language of the Oregon document.18 The majority of
the states with constitutional provisions on the point substantially follow
the federal constitution.1 9 North Dakota follows the majority, but the right
of confrontation is purely statutory.
20
The result in the instant case appears correct, but as indicated in the
concurring opinion, a sounder ground for the decision would seem to be that
the statute requiring testimony of imprisoned felons to be taken by deposition
denies the constitutional right to compulsory process.
2 1
KENNETH R. Yai
CounTs - JURISDICTION - FORUM NON CONVENIENS. - Plaintiff, a resident
and citizen of Nebraska, was injured in a railroad accident in that state.
The defendant railroad company did business in both Nebraska and Minnesota.
Plaintiff brought an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in
the District Court, Washington County, Minnesota. The action was dismissed
without prejudice on ground of forum non conveniens. On appeal, it was held,
that the trial court has the discretionary "power to invoke the doctrine forum
13. Catron v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 536, 105 S.W.2d 618 (1937).
14. Walls v. State, 194 Ark. 578, 109 S.W.2d 143 (1937); State v. Barnes, 274 Mo.
625, 204 S.W. 267 (1918); State v. Maynard, 184 N.C. 653, 113 S.E. 682 (1922).
15. Harrison v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 840, 100 S.W.2d 837 (1937); State v.
Hutchinson, 163 La. 146, 111 So. 656 (1927).
16. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878).
17. People v. Chin Hane, 108 Cal. 597, 41 Pac. 697 (1895); People v. Fish, 125
N. Y. 136, 26 N.E. 319 (1891); Drew v. Shaughnessy, 212 Wis. 322, 249 N.W. 522
(1933). But see State v. Potter, 6 Idaho 584, 57 Pac. 431, 432 (1899); State v.
Chambers 44 La. 603, 10 So. 886 (1892).
18. Ill. Const. Art. II, §9; Ind. Const. Art. I §65; Tenn. Const. Art. 1 §9.
19. Ark. Const. Art. II, §10; Ariz. Const. Art. II, §24; Minn. Const. Art. 1, §6; N. J.
Const. Art. I, §8; S. D. Const. Art. VI, §7.
20. N. D. Rev. Code, §29-0106 (1943) "In all criminal prosecutions the party ac-
cused shall have the right to meet the witnesses against him face to face."
21. Rudolph v. Ryan, 327 Mo. 728, 38 S.W.2d 717 (1931); approved at 8 Wigmorc.
Evidence 111 (3rd ed. 1940). Contra: Pirkle v. State, 31 Ala. App. 464, 18 So.2d 694
(1944); Tiner v. State, 110 Ark. 251, 161 S.W. 195 (1913).
